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This paper studies the effect of unconditional teacher salary increases on teacher and student 
outcomes. To study the issue, we evaluate the rural hardship for teachers in Zambia, which 
corresponds to a salary increase of 20%. This allowance is allocated to schools beyond a given 
distance from their district center, and this allows us to use a regression discontinuity design to 
identify its effects at the school level. We use administrative data from 2004 to 2015 on school 
and teacher characteristics and on Grade 7 student test scores. In addition, we perform a small 
telephone survey of schools close to the eligibility threshold for the allowance. We find that 
crossing the eligibility threshold increases the share of teachers obtaining the allowance by 
around 40pp. Because of the fairly high degree of non-compliance with the rule, our estimates 
are fairly imprecise. Focusing on the provinces where compliance is stronger we find some (albeit 
weak) evidence that the allowance increases the amount of teachers, their tenure, and reduces 
transfers away from schools. However, we find no effects on teacher characteristics or on student 
grades. All in all, it appears that the allowance succeeds in keeping teachers in rural areas, but 






1. Introduction  
There has been an explosion of research in recent years on the factors that can improve student 
learning in developing countries (see recent reviews in Snilstsveit et al. 2016 and Glewwe et al. 
2011). Teachers are one type of input that has received attention. Evidence from high income 
countries shows that teachers can have a large role in student learning and long term outcomes 
(Jackson et al. 2014; Chetty et al. 2014), and recent evidence from Pakistan suggests a high impact 
of teachers on grades in a developing country setting as well (Das et al. 2014). 
 
There have been several studies evaluating interventions aimed at increasing the productivity of 
teachers in developing countries. Most of these interventions have explicitly provided “hard” 
incentives to affect specific types of teacher behaviors. For instance, teacher presence has been 
incentivized by monitoring or providing financial incentives conditional on presence (Duflo et al. 
2012), and teachers contribution to student performance has been incentivized by providing 
financial rewards to teachers conditional on positive student test scores (Muralidharan et al 
2011, Kremer et al. 2010). While some of these interventions have proven successful, a recent 
review comparing the effect of different types of interventions on student learning concludes 
that the effects of teacher incentive interventions have been generally small (Snilstsveit et al. 
2016). Moreover, some studies find that such interventions have generated undesirable 
outcomes (such as teaching-to-the-test, see Kremer et al. 2010).  
 
There has been growing interest in the potential role of “soft” approaches to increase teacher 
productivity, that tap into behavioral responses such as reciprocity, or intrinsic motivation 
(Besley and Gathak 2014). In particular, higher unconditional wages may improve the productivity 
of public servants via selection of more motivated teachers (Dal Bo et al 2013), or via reciprocity. 
 
This paper studies the effect of unconditional increases in salaries on teacher and student 
outcomes. We do so by evaluating the effects of the rural hardship allowance in Zambia, which 
provides a 20% increase in salaries paid to teachers in rural schools. The rural hardship allowance 
is allocated to schools outside a given radius from district centers, and this allows us to estimate 
the effects of salaries using a regression discontinuity approach. We study the effect of the 
allowance on teacher attrition, teacher characteristics, and student grades. 
 
Several recent studies study the effect of unconditional wage increases on teacher and student 
outcomes in developing countries: in Brazil, Uruguay, Pakistan and Indonesia (Andrade da Silva 
Filho et al. 2014, Cabrera et al 2016, Das et al. 2016 and De Ree et al. 2015). All these studies 
tend to find either no effect or a small effect on student performance. However, more evidence 
is necessary to bring to bear on the question. The studies on Brazil and Pakistan (Andrade da Silva 
Filho et al. 2014 and Das et al. 2016, respectively) employ either a simple difference or a 
differences in differences estimator which may not be able to fully account for confounding 
factors. The studies on Uruguay and Indonesia (Cabrera et al 2016 and De Ree et al. 2015, 
respectively) address this problem by using experimental and quasi-experimental methods. 
However, the setting of both studies are middle income countries. Unconditional salary increases 
may well have different effects in low income countries where teacher salaries are very low and 
unconditional salary expansions may be most relevant. 
 
Our paper contributes to this nascent literature by using a quasi-experimental approach to study 
the effect of unconditional salary increments in a low-income setting. Our evaluation of the rural 
hardship allowance, not only concerns a relatively low income country such as Zambia, but also 
schools in rural areas with little infrastructure and amenities. The increase in salary provided by 
the allowance is of 20%, substantially lower than that in  De Ree et al. 2015. Nevertheless, in a 
difficult setting  such as rural Zambia, such increase can be of importance for the status of 
teachers in the area. 
 
Our paper also contributes to the literature on improving state capacity in developing countries. 
And here we concern ourselves with a small literature on whether pecuniary incentives can be 
effective in attracting and retaining public servants working under difficult conditions. Bo et al. 
(2013) study this issue in Mexico where it is difficult to attract workers to work in remote or 
challenging municipalities. Exploiting exogenous variation in wages generated by a field 
experiment, they find that prospective workers are more likely to accept job offers in challenging 
municipalities if offered higher wages. Antwi and Phillips (2013) study this within the context of 
the “Brain Drain” problem in Africa. They take advantage of sudden, policy-induced, wage 
increases for government health workers in Ghana. They find that the increases dramatically 
reduce the likelihood that public health workers emigrate from Ghana. This strand of the state 
capacity literature is surprisingly small given the pervasiveness of under-capacitated states in 
developing countries, especially in Africa (Mkandawire, 2002), and the role played by 
remuneration.  
 
Finally, evaluating the rural hardship allowance in Zambia is also important in itself. The rural 
hardship allowance was designed to reduce the relatively high teacher attrition experienced by 
schools in rural areas, where educational outcomes tend to be weakest, and thereby improve 
these outcomes. Our policy evaluation can therefore contribute to the design of policies seeking 
to reduce inequalities in the distribution of educational outcomes in Zambia.  
 
We construct a school level dataset merging the Zambian Annual School Census and the Grade 7 
Examination results to obtain information on teacher attrition, teacher characteristics and school 
grades in around 3000 schools from 2004 to 2015. The current allocation rule for the rural 
hardship allowance was established in 2010, and this implies that we can use outcomes pre- and 
post-treatment. In addition, we obtained a list of schools actually receiving the hardship 
allowance in 2017 from the government’s payroll department. 
 
The rule assigning the allowance is based on distances computed from GPS coordinates between 
district centers and the schools. This renders virtually impossible a manipulation of the running 
variable and lends credibility to our approach. Indeed, balance checks show that pre-treatment 
outcomes of schools at either side of the cutoff are similar. 
 
We find that the rule is not implemented consistently, leading to a first stage lower than 
anticipated. There are two reasons for this. First, some schools get reclassified ex-post if the GPS 
distance computed is considered to be a misleading measure of remoteness of the school.2 This 
problem reduces our first stage coefficient from 1 (if the rule were implemented perfectly) to 
around 0.5. Second, there is teacher-payroll mismatch in Zambia (Auditor General, 2014). The 
payroll database that determines the payment of salaries and allowances sometimes features 
teachers at schools where they no longer teach. This implies that there can be teachers obtaining 
the allowance teaching at schools ineligible to get the allowance. Because there is no official 
information on this, we conducted a telephone survey of head teachers for schools around the 
eligibility cutoff, stratified in pairs of schools close to each other. We succeeded in obtaining 
information for 137 schools, corresponding to 44 matched pairs, one at either side of the 
threshold. Taking this into account, the first stage coefficient drops slightly to around 0.4. 
Nevertheless, the instrument remains strong with F-statistics greater than 10 in all specifications. 
 
                                                     
2  For instance, we were told that if there is a natural barrier such as a mountain between the school and 
the district center, schools closer to the center than the threshold might be granted the allowance 
Because of the relatively low levels of compliance with the rule, our estimates are fairly 
imprecise. For this reason, we investigate the most complying provinces, where the first stage 
coefficient is around 0.65, in addition to the whole sample. Overall, we find some (weak) evidence 
that the allowance increases the stock of teachers and teacher tenure, suggesting that the 
allowance has a contribution to keeping teachers in rural stations. However, consistent with the 
literature above, we find no effect of the rural allowance on student outcomes, suggesting that 
unconditional salaries have little effect on teacher performance, even in low income countries.  
 
We also provide suggestive evidence from our telephone survey that distance to amenities and 
delays in payments may be more relevant for explaining teacher departures from schools around 
the threshold than salaries received through the rural allowance. We conjecture that if there are 
complementarities between salaries and amenities in the teacher’s utility function, the allowance 
could have a stronger effect if these amenities were present. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background on education in Zambia 
and on the rural hardship allowance for teachers. Section 3 describes the data and provides some 
descriptive statistics, while section 4 explains our empirical approach. Section 5 shows the 
results, section 6 discusses them, and section 7 provides some brief concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Background: Education in Zambia and the Rural Hardship Allowance 
Zambia’s education sector faced substantial setbacks following the economic crisis that began in 
the mid-1970s and the ensuing structural adjustment policies (SAPs) of the 1980s and 1990s. The 
country’s expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP declined from 5% in the 1960s and 
1970s to 2% in the 1980s and 1990s (World Bank, 2014). As a result, the pace of school 
construction and of teacher recruitment slowed down and did not keep up with population 
growth. Further, the reduced budgetary allocations to the sector served to make teaching a less 
attractive profession and many teachers left the profession or emigrated to neighbouring 
countries. Not surprisingly, the pupil-teacher ratio increased from about 40 in the 1970s to 50 in 
the 1990s and was even as high as 80 in the more rural parts of the country (Government of the 
Republic of Zambia, 2006). This occurred even when the primary school net enrolment ratio 
declined from 80% in the 1970s to 70% in the 1990s (ibid). These shocks to the country’s 
education sector are likely behind the less than satisfactory performance on internationally 
standardized tests. Zambia has, for instance, consistently performed at the low end of the 
Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Education Quality (SACMEQ). SACMEQ 
administers tests to assess the level of reading and maths abilities among Grade 6 pupils in the 
region.  
 
The government, recognizing the challenges faced by the education sector, instituted a number 
of policy responses in the last decade. The Basic Education Sub-Sector Investment Plan (BESSIP), 
which ran from 1999 to 2002, sought to increase access to and the quality of basic education in 
the country. One of BESSIP’s landmark achievements was the 2002 abolition of school attendance 
fees for Grades 1 to 7. Whereas BESSIP was largely successful in enhancing access, school quality 
suffered in its wake because it focused less on teacher recruitment and retention. The Ministry 
of Education’s subsequent policy plans (MoESP, NIF II and NIF III)3 have thus focused on improving 
quality primarily through the large-scale recruitment and retention of teachers. For instance, NIF 
II which ran from 2006 to 2011, set itself the target of recruiting 5000 teachers every year 
(Government of the Republic of Zambia, 2006). NIF III, set out to recruit 3000 teachers every year 
over the period 2011 to 2015 (Government of the Republic of Zambia, 2011).  
 
With such increases in teacher numbers came the concern that the quality of instruction might 
suffer, and the challenge to keep the teaching profession attractive. The government then 
instituted significant increments in teachers’ basic pay over the last decade or so, the most 
significant of which occurred in 2013 and saw salary increments of up to 200%. In addition to 
                                                     
3  MoESP stands for Ministry of Education Strategic Plan. It ran from 2003 to 2007. NIF II stands for National 
Implementation Framework II. It ran from 2006 to 2011 and was the framework guiding the Ministry of Education’s 
implementation of the Fifth National Development Plan. NIF III guided the Ministry of Education’s efforts in this 
regard between 2011 and 2015.   
this, a variety of incentive schemes have been devised (such as salary increments, allowances, 
teachers’ houses, training, etc…) with the aim of keeping and motivating teachers. 
 
To this end, the government implemented a rural/remote hardship allowance to reduce the 
attrition of teachers from rural schools. According to the Ministry of Education, in any given year 
7% of the teaching staff in rural areas leave versus 3% in urban areas. Similarly, the tenure of 
teachers in rural schools is on average 2 years shorter than it is in urban schools.4  
 
The allowance first emerged in the 1990s but was of a small quantity and plagued with problems.5 
In 2008, a substantial rural hardship allowance corresponding to 20% of the base salary was 
established for all public servants. The rule governing eligibility was a complex combination of 
distance of the rural station to various amenities (the rural station - clinic school, etc. - ought to 
be more than 20 Km from the nearest bank, 10 Km from nearest police station, etc.). In 2010, the 
rule for teachers changed, and was dramatically simplified. It was decided that the single criterion 
would be distance to the nearest district center. Schools beyond a pre-specified cut-off would 
qualify for the rural hardship allowance. Districts were divided into four categories according to 
their degree of remoteness and the cut-off was set differently for each of these categories. For 
instance, the most remote districts had a cut-off of zero (so that all schools qualified to obtain 
the allowance), moderately remote districts had a cut-off of between 20 and 25 Km and the most 
urban districts had a cut-off of 30 Km.  
 
We met several government officials to verify that this rule was actually implemented to pay the 
allowance. The rural hardship allowance is paid directly to teachers by the government’s payroll 
department on the basis of their database of schools and of school eligibility. The eligibility of 
each school is determined by the Ministry of Lands, which collects GPS coordinates of schools 
and computes distances to the nearest district centers. We verified that the rule used by the 
Ministry of Lands was indeed the one promulgated in 2010. Schools are allowed to contest their 
                                                     
4  Attrition and tenure estimates are taken from the Ministry of Education’s Annual Schools Census. See    
data section for more details. 
5  Personal communication, Ministry of Lands.  
allocation if, for instance, the school is separated from the nearest district center by natural 
barriers that makes the actual travel distance much longer than the GPS distance. In those cases, 
the eligibility status can be changed. This implies that the actual receipt of the allowance is not 
completely determined by the rule. 
 
One feature of the teacher pay system in Zambia which is potentially problematic for our analysis 
is that there is a mismatch between the schools where teachers are paid and where they actually 
teach (Auditor General, 2014). The government’s payroll department pays salaries (and 
allowances) on the basis of their database, but it appears that the database is not kept up-to-
date. This implies that when teachers move to a new school they may still appear in the payroll 
as being part of the former school. This also applies to the rural hardship allowance, and this 
implies that eligible schools may have some teachers that do not receive the allowance and vice 
versa. The size of the problem is unknown, but there are indications that it could be significant. 
The Auditor General (2014) provides an example of a school where half of its teachers were paid 
elsewhere. This could substantially reduce the strength of our instrument, if the problem is 
widespread, because it implies that the increase in salaries upon crossing the eligibility threshold 
is less than 20%. Because this issue has potentially severe implications for our analysis, we 
decided to undertake a telephone survey of schools around the threshold to ascertain the extent 





Our empirical analysis is based on two types of data: administrative data on schools including 
school-level information on allowance receipts and examination grades, and a telephone survey 
we conducted ourselves with head teachers close to the hardship allowance eligibility threshold.  
 
3.1. Administrative School Data 
The main data source for our analysis is the Annual School Census collected annually by the 
Ministry of General Education (MoGE). The census forms a vital part of the Ministry’s annual 
planning and programming activities. It contains a rich set of data on the characteristics of around 
9,000 schools across the country of which about 5,000 are run by the Zambian government. Our 
analysis is restricted to the government-run schools as these are the only ones for which the rural 
hardship allowance is applicable.  
 
At the beginning of each year, each school registered with the Ministry of General Education 
(MoGE) is sent a questionnaire. The questionnaire is completed by the head teacher and returned 
to the MoGE in the middle of the year. The questionnaire elicits a comprehensive set of 
information on teachers, pupils and the school itself. Head teachers are asked to fill-in 
information on the qualifications (professional and academic), tenure, age and gender of 
teachers. Information collected on the school itself includes the level of the school (basic or high 
school), entity responsible for the school (government, private, church, etc…), year the school 
was established and school infrastructure (desks, blackboards, toilets) among others. The 
characteristics of pupils (number, age, gender, etc…) are also collected.  
 
Fortunately for our purposes, the census also contains GPS coordinates for over 80% of 
government-run schools every year. We construct the running variable of distance to the nearest 
district center ourselves, using the school GPS coordinates and the GPS coordinates of district 
centers taken from Henn (2016).  
 
The Annual Schools Census has, in principle, been conducted every year since 2000. 
Unfortunately, there were some inconsistencies in the way variables were defined between 2000 
and 2004 making it difficult to use the data from earlier years. Therefore, our analysis only makes 
use of census data from 2004 to 2015, with the exception of the 2010 census whose files are not 
on the MoGE database.6  
                                                     
6  The absence of the 2010 files does not present much of a problem given that 2010 is, in 
any case, the year in which treatment starts. 
 
We use the Annual Schools Census to derive the main teacher outcome variables which are the 
transfer rate, the stock of teachers at a school and the average tenure of teachers at a school. 
The transfer rate measures the percentage of a school’s teachers who transfer out of that school 
to another school in a given year. Unfortunately, the census does not give additional information 
on the reasons for transferring out of a school. For example, teachers might transfer to another 
school to follow a spouse or might be asked to transfer to fill a vacancy at another school. It 
appears, however, that many transfers from rural schools in Zambia are mainly motivated by 
hardship concerns (Mulcahy-Dunn, et al. 2003). The other two main teacher variables are straight 
forward: the stock of teachers measures the number of teachers at a school. The average tenure 
measures the average number of years that teachers have continually served at a school.  
 
In addition to these, we also investigate two other outcome variables: the average years of 
schooling and the average age of teachers at a particular school in a given year. Much like the 
main outcome variables, these latter variables are constructed from data on individual teacher 
characteristics contained in the Annual Schools Census.  
 
We use data on outcome variables from before 2010 to check for pre-treatment balance, and as 
control variables to obtain more precise estimates in our analysis. 
 
The Annual Schools Census does not contain information on whether a school actually gets the 
rural hardship allowance. We obtained this information from the Payroll Management 
Establishment Control (PMEC) of the Government of Zambia. PMEC maintains the payroll of all 
civil servants in Zambia including teachers. The challenge is that the list from PMEC, aside from 
containing names of schools and districts in which schools are located, does not have numeric 
identifiers allowing us to seamlessly merge it with the Annual Schools Census. The merging was 
done manually with the Annual Schools Census using both the name of the school and the district 
in which the school is located. 
 
 
3.2.  Grade 7 Examinations Data 
We also seek to investigate whether the hardship allowance has any impact on learning 
outcomes via any impact it might have on teachers. Given that the Annual School Census does 
not contain any information on learning outcomes, we combine it with data on school-level 
performance on the Grade 7 Examinations. The Grade 7 Examinations, sometimes referred to as 
the Primary School Leaving Examinations, are the first high stakes exams in the Zambian school 
system. Performance on these exams determines whether candidates proceed onto secondary 
school. We have school-level performance data on the Grade 7 exams from 2010 to 2014 
provided by the Examinations Council of Zambia (ECZ). Individual performance on the exam is 
classified into one of four categories: Division One, Division Two, Division Three and Division Four. 
Division One is the highest level of achievement with Division Four being the lowest. We use the 
percentage of students at a school who score a Division One as the main outcome measure. The 
analysis is done separately for boys and girls.  
 
To merge the Annual Schools Census with the examinations data, we make use of a 2008 attempt 
made by the ECZ to link the EMIS number (Annual Schools Census unique school identifier) with 
the ECZ Facility Code (the unique school identifier in the ECZ database). We use the 2008 list to 
merge the two datasets with the caveat that the list has not been updated since 2008 to 
incorporate any new schools that might have been built since then that also qualify as 
examination centers.7 
 
We restrict our data to districts that are relevant for our empirical approach, i.e. where there is 
a chance of observing a school at the two sides of the rural allowance eligibility threshold. For 
instance, we drop remote districts where the cutoff is zero and all schools qualify for the 
allowance (see above), and we drop districts in Copperbelt Province which are very urbanized 
and where none of the schools are eligible for the allowance. For our regression discontinuity 
                                                     
7  An additional 708 government-run schools have been added to the Annual School Census between 2008 
and 2015.  
approach, we focus on schools close to the rural hardship allowance threshold. We keep schools 




3.3.  Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the administrative data we use. The top panel uses 
the entire sample of government-run schools from 2004 to 2015 and the bottom panel restricts 
the sample to the post-treatment period (2011 to 2015) for schools within a 10 Km radius of the 
rural hardship allowance threshold, which are the schools for which our effects will be identified. 
The last 2 rows of the bottom panel show statistics on school eligibility of the allowance and the 
proportion of schools actually getting the allowance, the latter statistic from the PMEC data 
described above.  
 
The data in Table 1 shows that, on average, 7% of a school’s teaching staff transfer to another 
school every year. Combining this information with the fact that schools are stocked with about 
13 teachers on average (second row) implies that a single teacher leaves every year. The table 
also shows that the average tenure of teachers at each school is about 10 years, with teachers 
having 36 years of age and 12 years of schooling on average. The fact that there is little spread in 
this latter variable around the average is interesting. It does suggest some form of strict 
enforcement of a rule requiring that teachers must have completed 12 years schooling before 
they can teach (the formal schooling system in Zambia runs from Grade 1 to Grade 12). Regarding 
student grades, 14% of boys and 12% of girls sitting for the exams score a Division One. As shown 
in panel B, schools around the rural allowance eligibility threshold are not very dissimilar from 
the average, the main difference being that they are somewhat smaller (10 teachers on average 
as opposed to 13). The last rows panel B show that within a 10kilometer radius of the threshold, 
53% of schools qualify to get the allowance whereas 55% actually get the allowance. To illustrate 
the rural-urban differences that motivate the introduction of the rural hardship allowance, Table 
2 reports differences in teacher and student outcomes across these locations. Notice that the 
differences we reported are probably a lower bound of the true differences because we have 
excluded the very rural and very urban districts, as mentioned above. The number of teachers 
per school tend to be much smaller in rural areas than in urban ones. This might in part be 
explained by the fact that urban schools are much bigger than rural schools, but is also likely to 
be driven by hardship concerns, as suggested by the higher percent of transfers out of school and 
the lower average tenure of teachers shown in the rows below. Moreover, student outcomes are 
also substantially weaker in rural areas. The only variable without spatial disparities is the teacher 
education variable where the average of 12 is equal in both regions – a fact possibly explained by 
the enforcement of minimum educational requirements to be a teacher.  
 
3.4. Telephone Survey 
In order to address the potential problem of teacher-payroll mismatch mentioned above, we 
conducted a telephone survey where we asked head teachers questions about teachers in their 
schools. The main questions in the survey asked how many teachers in each school were getting 
paid from another school and how many teachers were getting the rural hardship allowance. For 
the survey, we selected from the Annual School Census all schools close to the rural hardship 
allowance eligibility threshold (within 10kilometers of the threshold) and with a recorded 
telephone number for the head teacher. To improve power, we stratified the sample into groups 
of schools close to each other (within 15Kilometers of each other) and drew for each stratum one 
school at either side of the threshold. This led to a sample of 220 schools and we were able to 
reach 137 of them, representing 62% of the targeted sample resulting in 88 observations for 
which we had a full pair. All the head teachers we managed to reach agreed to respond to our 
queries with the exception of one.     
 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics from our sample of the telephone survey. The average 
number of teachers per school in the telephone survey is somewhat smaller than the 
corresponding figure from the administrative data in the bottom panel of Table 1. Further, the 
percentage of schools that qualify for the allowance and the percentage that actually get the 
allowance in Table 3 are not too different from the ones reported in the bottom panel of Table 
1. This suggests that the telephone survey is fairly, though not perfectly, representative. The bias 
probably comes from the fact that the schools we were able to reach are more likely to have 
mobile phone coverage, have more economic activity and thus bigger schools. 
 
Table 3 shows that around 40% of teachers are paid from another school, which is in line with 
the findings of payroll mismatch from the Auditor General’s Office.8 Whereas half of our sample 
ought to be getting the allowance, 62% state receiving it corresponding to 61% of the teachers. 
Figures for schools even closer to the threshold (within 5 Km) are similar. 
 
The last two rows of the table show the share of teachers not paid by the school, in schools a 
priori eligible or ineligible to get the allowance. If the teacher mismatch originates from teachers 
moving from rural schools to urban schools without informing payroll, it could threaten the 
validity of our approach. The table shows, however, that both eligible and ineligible schools have 
similar shares of teachers paid from somewhere else, suggesting that the problem of teacher 
mismatch does not affect the validity of our results. 
 
The quality of responses seemed satisfactory. In particular, we asked head teachers two separate 
questions about the allowance: first, if the school as a whole was eligible to get the allowance 
and, second, how many teachers, among those paid from the school, were getting the allowance. 
Theoretically, in an eligible school, all teachers paid from that school ought to be getting the 
allowance, whereas in a non-eligible school, none should. In a large majority of schools, this was 
indeed the case, and whenever there were departures, these were small.9 
 
 
                                                     
8  In personal communication with the Auditor General’s Office, the percent of teachers getting paid from 
another school was estimated at 30%.  
9  In particular, for schools reported to be not eligible, only in one case did the head teacher say that some 
teachers paid from the school were getting the allowance. For schools reporting to be eligible, only a minority of 
head teachers provided a different figure for the number of teachers getting the allowance and for those paid by 
the school, and even then, most were far off by just 1 or 2 teachers. 
 
4. Empirical Approach 
Obtaining the pure causal effect of unconditional salaries on teacher outcomes is generally 
difficult: Schools with highly paid teachers are likely to differ from schools with less well paid 
teachers in many respects, and all these differences may confound the pure effect of pay. For 
instance, urban schools may manage to pay higher wages while having better infrastructure, or 
having students from a wealthier background. In general, it is difficult to distinguish between the 
role of students' background from the role of teachers' pay on learning outcomes.  
 
The specific way the rural hardship allowance is implemented in Zambia provides us with an 
opportunity to estimate the effect of wage income on the behavior of teachers purged from any 
potential bias using a fuzzy regression discontinuity approach. In particular, we can use the 
eligibility rule based on distance to district center as an instrument for teacher salaries. 
 
Our data is at the school level. Thus, we can estimate the effect of the "wage bill" at the school 
level on school outcomes, such as the transfer rate, the stock of teachers at a school and the 
performance of students on the Grade 7 Examinations.  
 
 
4.1. RDD Model 
Consider an outcome 𝑌𝑖 of school 𝑖. Each school is observed at a particular time 𝑡 but we omit 
the subscript to lighten notation. Denote the per teacher salary income received in school 𝑖 by 
𝑊𝑖. Each district type has a distance cutoff to determine eligibility for the allowance. We denote 
by 𝑑𝑖 the distance of each school to the relevant cutoff. The equation of interest is then 
 
  𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝑔(𝑑𝑖) + 𝜌𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑊𝑖) + 𝛽
′𝑧𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖                         (1)  
 
where 𝑔 is a flexible function of the distance of each school to the relevant cutoff and 𝑧𝑖 is a 
vector of control variables. The coefficient of interest is 𝜌 which we assume captures the effect 
of all the ways in which wages affect outcomes (for instance via attracting teachers with specific 
characteristics).  
 
Per teacher wages 𝑊𝑖 might be correlated with 𝑢𝑖  because schools pay an amount of salaries that 
depend on characteristics linked with the performance of the school. For instance, more 
ambitious teachers may obtain higher qualifications and thereby obtain higher wages while 
teaching in areas where students have better family background. For this reason, we exploit 
variation in the rural hardship allowance across schools. We decompose total wages into the 
rural hardship allowance and the rest. We denote non-allowance salary by 𝑊𝑖~ , the percent 
increase in income that the allowance implies by 𝑟 (which is 0.2 in our case) and the share of 
teachers in the school getting the allowance by 𝑛𝑖. Thus per teacher salary equals 𝑊𝑖 =
𝑊𝑖~(1 + 𝑟𝑛𝑖). Applying the approximation 𝑙𝑜𝑔(1 + 𝑥) ≈ 𝑥 allows us to rewrite equation 1 as: 
 
            𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝑔(𝑑𝑖) + 𝜌𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑊𝑖~ + 𝜌𝑟𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽
′𝑧𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖     (2). 
 
Equation 2 shows that the coefficient of interest 𝜌, which captures the effect of wages on 
outcomes in equation 1, can be identified by exogenous variation in the share of teachers that 
obtain the allowance. Conditional on a smooth function of 𝑑𝑖, eligibility to obtain the allowance 
ought to be random. This is plausible given that the eligibility rule is based on distance to the 
nearest district center as computed by Ministry of Lands using a school’s and district center GPS 
coordinates. Therefore, there are scant possibilities of manipulating eligibility to obtain the 
allowance (we formally test the possibility of manipulations in the running variable below). Our 
first stage is: 
 
 𝑛𝑖 = 𝛼1 + ℎ(𝑑𝑖) + 𝜏𝐼{𝑑𝑖 > 0} + 𝛾
′𝑧𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖     (3) 
 
where 𝐼{𝑑𝑖 > 0} is an indicator of whether the school is beyond the distance cutoff 𝑑 = 0. The 
coefficient 𝜏 will be less than one to the extent that the allocation rule is not strictly followed, 
either because some ineligible schools do get the allowance or because of the payroll mismatch 
issue.  
 
In our administrative data (specifically from PMEC), we only have information on whether the 
school as a whole gets the allowance or not. We do not have information on the share of teachers 
getting the allowance. Therefore, strictly speaking, we can only obtain 𝜏 and consequently 𝜌 using 
the first stage from the telephone survey described in Section 3.10  In the event, the first stages 
from the administrative data and the telephone survey are not very different. Therefore, for 
convenience, we report our IV results using the administrative data and discuss potential 
necessary adjustments where appropriate. The interpretation of the IV coefficients that we will 
report is thus the effect of having all teachers in the school (as opposed to none) obtain the 
allowance, which is equivalent to the effect of an increase in the teacher wage bill of 20%. 
 
We estimate different specifications of the equations above using alternative windows 
(bandwidths) around the cutoff with different polynomial specifications of the running variable. 
We report results for three specifications: windows of 20 Km, and 10 Km with a linear polynomial 
of the running variable allowed to differ at either side of the threshold (i.e. interacted with the 
indicator variable 𝐼{𝑑𝑖 > 0}), and a window of 20 Km with a cubic polynomial. All our 
specifications control for constituency fixed effects and, when possible (i.e. except for Grade 7 
results), for the corresponding pre-treatment outcome.  
 
4.2. Manipulation of the running variable 
                                                     
10  Using administrative data to perform the first stage is still informative. The instrumental variables (IV) 
estimate using this first stage captures the effect of the policy as intended. Policymakers may use some discretion 
and grant the allowance to schools that are ineligible by the distance criterion alone. The reduced form result does 
not take this into account and would therefore underestimate the intended effect of the policy. The IV estimate 
using the administrative data as first stage takes account of this discretion. However, the teacher payroll mismatch 
is unintended. If, in the limit, the mismatch was complete, schools at either side of the threshold would have the 
same share of teachers getting the allowance. The appropriate assessment of the policy would be that it failed, 
because the policy would indeed have failed to reward teachers in rural areas. In this scenario, the reduced form 
coefficient and the IV coefficient using administrative data would show a zero effect. But the IV using the telephone 
survey would be indeterminate because the first-stage coefficient would be zero.  
The RDD approach rests on the fact that there is random assignment into treatment and control 
groups within a neighborhood of the eligibility threshold. In other words, subjects should not 
manipulate their way into either the treatment or control group. In our particular case, 
manipulation would entail that schools falsify their GPS coordinates so as to be further from the 
nearest district center than they really are. The probability of this happening is very small for two 
reasons. First, GPS coordinates are not supplied by individual schools but transparently collected 
using handheld GPS devices by officers from the Surveyor General’s Department in the Ministry 
of Lands. The Ministry of Lands is, in as far as this is concerned, totally independent from the 
Ministry of General Education. Second, GPS coordinates lend themselves to easy verification 
making falsification highly unlikely. In any case, we formally test the possibility that schools are 
non-randomly sorting themselves into the treatment group by, among other things, manipulating 
their GPS coordinates.  
 
Figure 1 is a histogram of schools plotted against the running variable (distance to threshold) 
restricted to 20kilometers around the threshold. Schools with a positive running variable qualify 
to receive the rural hardship allowance whereas those with a negative running variable do not 
qualify. If manipulation were present, we would expect to see an unusually high number of 
schools immediately to the right of zero in our histogram. The fact that we do not see this unusual 
piling up is suggestive of the absence of manipulation of the running variable. Manipulation can 
formally be tested using statistical methods. We use the manipulation test proposed by Cattaneo 
et al. (2017b) which is related to the well known test by McCrary (2008). Performing the test on 
our running variable delivers a p-value of 0.870 (Wald t-statistic = 0.152) hence a failure to reject 
the null of a continuity at the threshold.11  
 
4.3. Pretreatment Balance 
In addition to the absence of manipulation, the RDD method requires that there be balance in 
outcomes between control and treatment groups prior to treatment. In our case, this requires 
                                                     
11  The bandwidth is restricted to 20kilometers around the zero threshold.  
that there should not be any significant treatment effects in all our outcome variables prior to 
2010.  
 
Table 4 shows the results of such an exercise. Pre-treatment balance is confirmed for all our 
outcome variables in all specifications with the exception of column 1 for log teachers.12 To assess 
if this is problematic, figure 2 plots the graphical counterpart of the regressions for log teachers: 
the residuals of regressions of log teachers on constituency dummies as a function of the distance 
to the threshold, using a window of 20 Km around the threshold. The left panel shows the 
predicted values from a  regression that uses a linear specification, as in column 1 in Table 4, 
while the right panel uses a polynomial of degree 3, as in column 3 of Table 4. It is clear that the 
high and significant coefficient when using a linear specification comes from the non linearity of 
the function and not from some genuine difference at either side of the threshold. Although this 
will need to be borne in mind when we consider our results, it does not indicate a basic problem 






5.1. First stage  
 
5.1.1. Administrative data 
Table 5 shows the first stage coefficients using administrative data. That is, data from the Payroll 
Management Establishment Control (PMEC) and from the Annual School Census. The first two 
columns in use a linear specification with windows of 20 Km and 10 Km, respectively, while 
column 3 uses a window of 20 Km and a cubic polynomial.  
 
                                                     
12 Unfortunately, we cannot check for pre-treatment balance for the Grade 7 Examinations because we do 
not have the data for the years before treatment.    
The table shows that schools that are near the threshold and qualify to get the allowance are 
around 50 pp. more likely to actually get the allowance some small variations depending on the 
specification. The F-statistics for instrument strength are all greater than 10.  
 
These first stage coefficients indicate quite a strong degree of non-compliance. To investigate 
this further, figure 3 plots the first stage: the jump in schools getting the allowance once the 
threshold is crossed.  Non compliance is stronger on the left of the threshold (around 20%) than 
on the right side (around 10%). This makes sense, as it implies that some of the schools that do 
not qualify to get the allowance do so, possibly due to the type of discretion discussed above. 
The fact that around 10% of schools ought to get the allowance but do not get it is more 
surprising.  Part of this may reflect a partial failure of our merging of payroll data with the Annual 
School Census data. The telephone survey can help assessing this. It turns out that the matching 
between the merged payroll data and the telephone survey data is quite good. Only 4% of schools 
are categorized differently in the payroll data relative to the telephone survey data. It appears 
that there are other reasons for non-compliance. 
 
In order to investigate the lack of compliance further, we run first stage regressions separately 
by province. Table 6 shows the results. There are clear differences in the implementation of the 
rule. Two provinces barely seem to be implementing the rule whereas three others display fairly 
large coefficients, above 0.6. It thus appears that part of the compliance problem might be 
genuine problem of implementation of the rule in some areas.  
 
Given the differences in first stage by region, In what follows we will perform the analysis for the 
whole sample, as well as for the regions with best compliance. 
 
 
5.1.2. Telephone Survey data 
Table 7 shows the first stage coefficients using the telephone survey. As discussed above, we 
consider two endogenous variables: school getting the allowance and the share of teachers 
getting the allowance in a school. We regress each of these endogenous variables on the full set 
of stratification dummies and the indicator variable of eligibility 𝑑 > 0, using a bandwidth of 10 
Km in the first column and of 5 Km in the second. The specification with 10 Km bandwidth 
controls for distance to the threshold interacted with the eligibility variable. Schools close to the 
threshold but at the far end are around 45pp more likely to get the allowance.13 When 
considering the share of teachers getting the allowance, the coefficient drops to around 0.4. 
 
Under the RDD assumption that schools at either side of the threshold are on average similar 
except for the allowance, this implies that teachers on the other side side of the cutoff earn 
around 8% more than teachers at non-qualifying schools (0.4 more teachers getting 0.2 more 
income from the allowance). Due to the small resulting sample size, we do not perform the 
telephone survey fist stage analysis with the subsample of the most complying provinces. 
However, adjusting the 0.65 first stage coefficient for this subsample in the same manner as for 
the full data we obtain a coefficient of around 0.55, which implies a jump in salary of around 11%. 
 
5.2. Reduced form results 
Tables 8 shows the results of regressing outcome variables directly on the indicator variable of 
eligibility 𝑑 > 0 while controlling for different specifications of the running variable, constituency 
dummies and, where possible, predetermined outcomes. 
 
The table shows that generally there are no statistical significant effects of the allowance on 
teacher or student outcomes. However, beyond this general pattern, there are some specific 
patterns that deserve to be noted. First, coefficients for log teachers and teacher tenure are 
almost always positive. Second, however, coefficients for teacher transfers are very small and 
positive. This is counter to our expectations, since if the allowance succeeds in keeping teachers, 
it should reduce transfers. Third, coefficients for teacher characteristics and student grades are 
also generally small. For student outcomes, results are somewhat volatile. Results for boys are 
                                                     
13  This is slightly higher than the estimates from the administrative data, possibly because the schools in the 
telephone survey are somewhat more “developed” than average, as mentioned above, and may implement the 
rule more stringently.  
generally positive and occasionally statistically significant, but in some specifications it turns 
negative. For girls, the pattern is exactly the other way around. Given that for student outcomes 
we are unable to control for  predetermined outcomes, these estimates are more imprecise and 
this is likely to account for the varying results we observe.   
 
Thus, the allowance may have some impact in keeping teachers in rural areas, but the evidence 
in support of this is rather weak. While the evidence on the stock of teachers and teacher tenure 
at the school is consistent with this, the small positive coefficients for transfers is not.14 In any 
case, what does seem fairly clear is that the allowance does not seem to have a significant and 
robust effect on teacher characteristics or on student performance. 
 
5.3. IV results 
Table 9 shows the IV results obtained from using the indicator variable of eligibility 𝑑 > 0 as an 
instrumental variable for schools actually getting the allowance. 
 
As expected, IV results are qualitatively the same as the reduced form ones, with almost no 
statistically significant result. The advantage is that they can be easily interpreted quantitatively, 
as the effect of having all teachers obtain the rural allowance (as opposed to none), which is 
equivalent to a 20% salary increase. Most of the coefficients are small, notably regarding teacher 
transfers, teacher characteristics and student grades. The coefficients for the stock of teachers 
and teacher tenure, however, are non-negligible. The coefficients imply that a school obtaining 
the rural allowance would increase teacher tenure by around half a year on average and succeed 
in retaining 10% more teachers. Again, however, these estimates are rather imprecise. As before, 
the conclusion that seems to emerge form the table is that the allowance may have some impact 
                                                     
14  As mentioned above, the transfer variable is a noisy measure of hardship-related 
departures from the school because this variable incorporates other motives for transfers and 
because it does not include resignations out of the profession. Miss-measurement could be a 
reason why the results for transfers are not in line with the patterns found for teacher stock 
and tenure.  
on teacher retention, although the evidence for this is weak, but has little effect on other teacher 
and student outcomes. 
 
5.4 Results for most complying provinces 
 
Tables 10 and 11 provide the reduced form and IV results for the three most complying regions, 
with first stages over 0.6. Results are more encouraging. Coefficients for log teachers and teacher 
tenure are now generally larger and, in column 1, statistically significant. The coefficient for 
teacher transfers is now negative, the “right” sign (though not statistically significant). This paints 
a more consistent picture whereby the allowance seems to succeed in keeping some teachers in 
rural areas, at least in the provinces where it is well implemented.  Coefficients for teacher 
characteristics and student performance are, however, not improved when focusing on these 
provinces and so conclusions regarding these remain unchanged.  
 
It is worth noting that the specification that delivers significant results is the least conservative 
of all and there is some concern that it is not flexible enough. Indeed, the balance tests above 
showed that, for log teachers, this specification fails. However, several reasons make us 
cautiously conclude that the allowance seems to be fulfilling its intended role of keeping teachers 
in the rural areas. First, the coefficient for log teachers is not only positive in column 1, but also 
in the other specifications where pre-treatment values are balanced, and the size of the 
coefficient is as large in column 3 as in column 1. Second, the results in the Table 10 already 
control for pre-treatment log teachers, so the “jump” in pre-treatment log teachers is not driving 
the results in column 1. Third, the balance problem of the specification in column 1 applies only 
to log teachers. It does not apply to teacher tenure, so the significant coefficient in column 1 for 
this variable is more trustworthy.  
 
Figures 4 and 5 show the graphical representation of the reduced form, for log teachers and 
teacher tenure, respectively. Both figures show the results separately using all data and the data 
most complying provinces. The figures confirm our main points. There is a jump in log teachers 
and teacher tenure at the threshold, but the noise in the data obscures it to a certain extent 
preventing us from stating strong conclusions. At the same time, the jumps do not appear to be 
driven by non-linearities of the pattern of points, as was the case for pre-treatment log teachers. 
Therefore, the caution in our conclusions comes from a lack of precision, not from a concern with 
validity. 
 
The IV results using the most complying provinces do not show a dramatic increase in coefficients 
relative to the results using the whole country. Still, the allowance is estimated to increase the 
teacher stock by slightly over 10% and increase the tenure of teachers at the school between 0.5 





Our null results regarding the effect of the allowance on student grades is consistent with recent 
findings in the literature on the effect of unconditional salary increases on teacher performance 
and student learning (Andrade da Silva Filho et al. 2014, Cabrera et al 2016, Das et al. 2016 and 
De Ree et al. 2015). It appears that this results generalizes to a low income setting such as Zambia, 
and using a quasi-experiment based on a real policy. 
 
We find generally positive effects on the number of teachers and on teacher tenure. These are 
generally not significant when considering the whole country, but become so in some 
specifications when restricting our attention to provinces where the rule is implemented better. 
Our estimates suggest that the allocation increases the stock of teachers by around 10% and the 
tenure of teachers by between half and 0.8 years. These estimates are very similar to those 
obtained using a similar policy and a similar approach in Uruguay: Cabrera et al 2016 find that an 
allowance increasing salaries by around 25% raised teacher tenure by between half and one year.  
 
Our telephone survey, however, provides some suggestive evidence that factors other than 
teacher salaries may have a stronger impact on teacher mobility decisions. We asked head 
teachers how many teachers had left the school in the previous 3 years and how many had left 
in order to work at a “better school”. We also considered four types of factors that could 
potentially affect the decision of teachers to stay. First, we asked about access to infrastructure 
for teachers in terms electricity and piped water in their dwelling and whether their housing was 
made out of brick; we combined these into an index using the first component of a principal 
component analysis. Second we considered distance to amenities, operationalized as distance to 
the nearest bank. Third, we considered that not only the amount of salaries matter, but also 
whether they are paid on time or not, so we asked whether there were delays in paying salaries. 
Finally, we considered community incentives such as land gifts as potentially stronger triggers of 
reciprocity than salaries. Table A1 shows the descriptive statistics of these variables. 
 
We perform straightforward OLS regressions of teacher departure variables on these  
explanatory variables just described. For comparability, we standardized all variables dividing 
them by their respective standard deviation. To these explanatory variables, we add the share of 
teachers in the school obtaining the rural allowance, which is our best measure of salary 
differences between schools. Table 12 shows the results of this illustrative exercise using as 
outcome variable total teacher departures in column 1 and those leaving for a “better school” in 
column 2. Generally, coefficients have the expected sign. And indeed, the allowance variable 
appears negatively related to both teacher departure variables. However, most coefficients are 
fairly small and statistically insignificant. The exceptions are distance to nearest bank (for total 
departures) and payment delays (for departing to a better school). This suggests the possibility 
that salary considerations maybe secondary to distance to amenities or to delays in payments for 
these types of school. Of course, this is a mere conjecture at this stage, which would need to be 






7. Concluding Remarks 
This paper has studied the effect of unconditional wage increases on teacher and student 
learning outcomes in Zambia. The rural hardship allowance for teachers in Zambia represents a 
20% increase and is allocated in a way that allows us to estimate this effect using a regression 
discontinuity design. The rule is partially followed. Partly this is because there is some 
idiosyncrasy around granting the allowance to schools above and beyond the allocation rule, and 
partly because there is some teacher-salary mismatch whereby teachers get paid from schools 
other than where they actually teach. Our first stage is nevertheless highly significant and 
represents a jump in salary of around 8% (11% when considering the most complying provinces). 
 
We find weak evidence that the allowance is achieving its objective regarding teacher mobility 
decisions, succeeding in keeping more teachers in rural areas. However, the imprecision of our 
estimates implies this conclusion is very cautious. Moreover, we find no significant effect of the 
allowance on teacher characteristics or on student test results. We provide suggestive evidence 
that non-monetary considerations such as distance to amenities or delays in payment may be 
more relevant for teacher mobility in rural schools than monetary income. This evidence, 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for full and restricted sample 
 
PANEL A 
Variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
 Transfer share 0.069 0.146 0.000 1.000 29007 
Stock of Teachers 12.997 14.198 1.000 100 29007 
Tenure of Teachers (Years) 10.430 4.216 0.000 43.333 25532 
Education level of teachers (Years) 11.828 0.494 6.000 19.000 28542 
Age of teachers (Years) 36.244 3.429 20.800 63.000 20392 
Percentage of Boys with Division One 14.223 16.071 0.000 100.000 8184 
Percentage of Girls with Division One 11.858 15.918 0.000 100.000 8174 
PANEL B 
Variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
Transfer share 0.095 0.164 0.000 1.000 3488 
Stock of Teachers 10.216 6.841 1.000 88.000 3488 
Tenure of Teachers (Years) 9.776 2.898 1.000 36.667 3385 
Education level of teachers (Years) 11.975 0.190 9.600 13.333 3411 
Age of teachers (Years) 36.404 2.919 9.125 52.000 3384 
Percentage of Boys with Division One 13.084 15.115 0.000 100.000 2323 
Percentage of Girls with Division Two 11.023 15.302 0.000 100.000 2320 
School eligible to get allowance 0.531 0.499 0.000 1.000 3488 
School gets allowance 0.555 0.497 0.000 1.000 3488 
Descriptive statistics from a combination of the Annual School Census, Grade 7 Examinations and Allowance data from PMEC.  
Panel A refers to the full sample. Panel B refers to a sample restricted to schools within a 10 Km radius of the threshold post-
treatment.  
  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for urban and rural areas 
 
Variable Urban Rural Observations 
Transfer share 0.054 0.078 29007 
Stock of teachers 23.441 7.928 29007 
Tenure of teachers (Years) 11.208 10.04 25532 
Education level of teachers (Years) 11.845 11.820 28542 
Age of teachers (Years) 36.878 35.905 20392 
Percent of Boys with Division 1 16.213 13.283 8184 
Percent of Girls with Division 1 14.179 10.760 8174 








 10 Km radius   5 Km radius 
 Mean SD   Mean SD 
Number of teachers 12.64 8.47    12.74 10.54 
Share of teachers paid from another school 0.38 0.24   0.41 0.25 
School a priori eligible to get the allowance 0.5 0.5   0.5 0.51 
School gets allowance 0.62 0.49   0.62 0.49 
Share of teachers getting the allowance 0.61 0.38   0.6 0.37 
Share of teachers paid from another school in a priori eligible 0.37 0.23   0.44 0.27 
Share of teachers paid from another school in a priori not eligible 0.39 0.25   0.37 0.23 
N 88     34   
 








 {1} {2} {3} 
Outcomes 
  Log Teachers 0.31 0.044 0.001 
   (0.048)*** (0.062) (0.058) 
  Teacher Tenure -0.124 -0.003 -0.134 
   (0.306) (0.457) (0.41) 
  Share Teachers Transfered to Other 
School 
-0.002 0 -0.002 
   (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) 
  Teacher Age -0.122 0.176 0.092 
   (0.318) (0.472) (0.426) 
  Teacher Education 0.024 0.013 0.007 
   (0.03) (0.047) (0.042) 
Specifications 
  Window 20 Kms 10 Kms 20 Kms 
  Poly.order 1 1 3 
  Interaction Yes Yes No 
  N.schools 1449 708 1449 
Robust standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parenthesis. Significance codes: 0.01 ‘***’ 0.05 ‘**’ 0.1 ‘*’. 
Each row uses a different outcome variable. The first two columns use windows of respectively 20kms and 10kms around the 
threshold and a linear specification, while the third column uses a window of 20kms and a cubic specification. The interaction 





Table 5: First stage administrative data 
 
First stage administrative data 
  
 {1} {2} {3} 
Outcomes 
  Allowance 0.55 0.459 0.49 
   (0.042)*** (0.065)*** (0.058)*** 
Specifications 
  Window 20 Kms 10 Kms 20 Kms 
  Poly.order 1 1 3 
  Interaction Yes Yes No 
  N.schools 1464 714 1464 
Robust standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parenthesis. Significance codes: 0.01 ‘***’ 0.05 ‘**’ 0.1 ‘*’. 
The first two columns use windows of respectively 20kms and 10kms around the threshold and a linear specification, while the 






Table 6: First stage administrative data, by province 
 
First stage by region 
  
 {1} {2} {3} {4} {5} {6} {7} {8} 
allowance 0.658 0.355 0.734 0.63 0.536 0.483 0.469 0.157 
 (0.098)*** (0.201)* (0.078)*** (0.123)*** (0.13)*** (0.087)*** (0.177)*** (0.177) 
subset Central Lusaka Southern Luapula 
Northern/ 
Muchinga 
Eastern Northwestern Western 
N.schools 216 78 267 174 210 316 116 106 
  






 {1} {2} 
School getting allowance 0.412 0.529 
 (0.205)* (0.125)*** 
Share teachers getting allowance 0.359 0.421 
 (0.132)*** (0.076)*** 
Bandwidth 10 Km 5 Km 
N 88 34 
 
Robust standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parenthesis. Significance codes: 0.01 ‘***’ 0.05 ‘**’ 0.1 ‘*’.  
 
  




 {1} {2} {3} 
Outcomes 
  Log Teachers 0.045 0 0.045 
   (0.026)* (0.036) (0.034) 
  Teacher Tenure 0.29 0.405 0.214 
   (0.218) (0.305) (0.289) 
  Share Teachers Transfered to Other 
School 
0.002 0.004 0.011 
   (0.008) (0.012) (0.011) 
  Teacher Age -0.054 0.163 -0.01 
   (0.224) (0.316) (0.293) 
  Teacher Education 0.011 -0.003 0.009 
   (0.016) (0.023) (0.022) 
  Division One Boys 0.02 0.004 -0.014 
   (0.011)* (0.015) (0.014) 
  Division One Girls 0.009 -0.019 -0.031 
   (0.011) (0.015) (0.014)** 
Specifications 
  Window 20 Kms 10 Kms 20 Kms 
  Poly.order 1 1 3 
  Interaction Yes Yes No 
  N.schools 1186 590 1186 
 
Robust standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parenthesis. Significance codes: 0.01 ‘***’ 0.05 ‘**’ 0.1 ‘*’. 
Each row uses a different outcome variable. The first two columns use windows of respectively 20kms and 10kms around the 
threshold and a linear specification, while the third column uses a window of 20kms and a cubic specification. The interaction 
term interacts treatment status with the running variable.  
Table 9: IV results, all schools 
IV results 
  
 {1} {2} {3} 
Outcomes 
  Log Teachers 0.099 0.009 0.094 
   (0.049)** (0.08) (0.071) 
  Teacher Tenure 0.507 0.935 0.447 
   (0.406) (0.711) (0.611) 
  Share Teachers Transfered to Other 
School 
0.003 0.005 0.023 
   (0.015) (0.027) (0.024) 
  Teacher Age -0.133 0.339 -0.021 
   (0.419) (0.729) (0.619) 
  Teacher Education 0.023 -0.003 0.019 
   (0.029) (0.054) (0.045) 
  Division One Boys 0.037 0.007 -0.028 
   (0.019)* (0.032) (0.028) 
  Division One Girls 0.017 -0.041 -0.062 
   (0.019) (0.032) (0.028)** 
Specifications 
  Window 20 Kms 10 Kms 20 Kms 
  Poly.order 1 1 3 
  Interaction Yes Yes No 
  N.schools 1186 590 1186 
Robust standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parenthesis. Significance codes: 0.01 ‘***’ 0.05 ‘**’ 0.1 ‘*’. 
The endogenous variable is an indicator function of whether the school receives the allowance. Each row uses a different outcome 
variable. The first two columns use windows of respectively 20kms and 10kms around the threshold and a linear specification, 
while the third column uses a window of 20kms and a cubic specification. The interaction term interacts treatment status with 
the running variable.  
Table 10: Reduced Form, most complying schools 
 
 
Reduced Form in regions with high compliance 
  
 {1} {2} {3} 
Outcomes 
  Allowance 0.678 0.546 0.599 
   (0.057)*** (0.085)*** (0.078)*** 
  Log Teachers 0.085 0.033 0.063 
   (0.043)** (0.057) (0.054) 
  Teacher Tenure 0.549 0.308 0.198 
   (0.308)* (0.405) (0.4) 
  Share of Transfers -0.008 -0.006 -0.001 
   (0.011) (0.016) (0.015) 
  Teacher Age 0.17 0.065 0.156 
   (0.335) (0.486) (0.44) 
  Teacher Education 0.004 -0.055 -0.033 
   (0.023) (0.029)* (0.029) 
  Division One Boys 0.023 -0.001 -0.026 
   (0.018) (0.023) (0.022) 
  Division One Girls 0.015 -0.02 -0.043 
   (0.019) (0.024) (0.024)* 
Specifications 
  Window 20 Kms 10 Kms 20 Kms 
  Poly.order 1 1 3 
  Interaction Yes Yes No 
  N.schools 503 243 503 
Robust standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parenthesis. Significance codes: 0.01 ‘***’ 0.05 ‘**’ 0.1 ‘*’. 
Each row uses a different outcome variable. The first two columns use windows of respectively 20kms and 10kms around the 
threshold and a linear specification, while the third column uses a window of 20kms and a cubic specification. The interaction 
term interacts treatment status with the running variable.  
Table 11: IV results, most complying schools 
 
IV results in regions with high compliance 
  
 {1} {2} {3} 
Outcomes 
  Log Teachers 0.128 0.056 0.106 
   (0.064)** (0.106) (0.093) 
  Teacher Tenure 0.827 0.572 0.337 
   (0.474)* (0.77) (0.685) 
  Share Teachers Transfered to Other 
School 
-0.012 -0.011 -0.002 
   (0.016) (0.029) (0.025) 
  Teacher Age 0.257 0.155 0.265 
   (0.504) (0.9) (0.751) 
  Teacher Education 0.005 -0.1 -0.056 
   (0.034) (0.056)* (0.049) 
  Division One Boys 0.033 -0.002 -0.045 
   (0.026) (0.041) (0.039) 
  Division One Girls 0.022 -0.035 -0.073 
   (0.027) (0.044) (0.043)* 
Specifications 
  Window 20 Kms 10 Kms 20 Kms 
  Poly.order 1 1 3 
  Interaction Yes Yes No 
  N.schools 503 243 503 
Robust standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parenthesis. Significance codes: 0.01 ‘***’ 0.05 ‘**’ 0.1 ‘*’. 
The endogenous variable is an indicator function of whether the school receives the allowance. Each row uses a different outcome 
variable. The first two columns use windows of respectively 20kms and 10kms around the threshold and a linear specification, 
while the third column uses a window of 20kms and a cubic specification. The interaction term interacts treatment status with 
the running variable.  




Share Teachers that Left 
Share Teachers that Left for 
Better School 
Share of teachers getting the 
allowance 
-0.063 -0.071 
 (0.095) (0.093) 
   
Infrastructure Index -0.016 -0.080 
 (0.088) (0.086) 
   
Distance to Bank 0.137 0.084 
 (0.095) (0.093) 
   
Delay in Salary Payment 0.073 0.211** 
 (0.088) (0.086) 
   
Land Gift 0.009 0.086 
 (0.087) (0.085) 
  
Table A1: Descriptive statistics teacher departure-related variables in telephone survey 
 
 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
 
Share Teachers that Left 137 0.321 0.244 0.000 1.333 
Share Teachers that Left for Better School 137 0.100 0.139 0.000 0.667 
Share Teachers with Brick House 137 0.605 0.285 0.000 1.500 
Share Teachers with Electricity 137 0.124 0.257 0.000 1.000 
Share Teachers with Piped Water 137 0.035 0.139 0.000 1.000 
Distance to Bank 137 36.079 15.448 1.000 135.000 
Delay in Salary Payment Little 137 0.745 0.438 0 1 
Delay in Salary Payment Lot 137 0.022 0.147 0 1 
Land Gift 137 0.628 0.485 0 1 
 
  








Figure 2: Balance of pretreatment Log education. Linear and cubic specifications 
 
 
     
 
  
Figure 3: Illustration of first stage. Share of schools getting the allowance as a function of 





Figure 4: Log education, All data and most complying provinces 
 
 





Figure 5: Teacher Tenure, All data and most complying provinces 
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